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Distributed knowledge is the sum of the knowledge in a group; what someone who is able to discern
between two possible worlds whenever any member of the group can discern between them, would
know. Sometimes distributed knowledge is referred to as the potential knowledge of a group, or
the joint knowledge they could obtain if they had unlimited means of communication. In epistemic
logic, the formula DGϕ is intended to express the fact that group G has distributed knowledge of ϕ ,
that there is enough information in the group to infer ϕ . But this is not the same as reasoning about
what happens if the members of the group share their information. In this paper we introduce an
operator RG, such that RGϕ means that ϕ is true after G have shared all their information with each
other – after G’s distributed knowledge has been resolved. The RG operators are called resolution
operators. Semantically, we say that an expression RGϕ is true iff ϕ is true in what van Benthem [11,
p. 249] calls (G’s) communication core; the model update obtained by removing links to states for
members of G that are not linked by all members of G. We study logics with different combinations
of resolution operators and operators for common and distributed knowledge. Of particular interest
is the relationship between distributed and common knowledge. The main results are sound and
complete axiomatizations.
1 Introduction
In epistemic logic [6, 8, 5] different notions of group knowledge describe different ways in which knowl-
edge can be associated with a group. Common knowledge is stronger than individual knowledge: that
something is common knowledge requires not only that everybody in the group knows it, but that every-
body knows that everybody knows it, and so on. Distributed knowledge, on the other hand, is weaker
than individual knowledge: distributed knowledge is knowledge that is distributed throughout the group
even if no individual knows it.
More concrete informal descriptions of the concept of distributed knowledge abound, but they are
often inaccurate descriptions of the concept as formalized in standard epistemic logic. A misconception
is that something is distributed knowledge in a group if the agents in the group could get to know it
after some (perhaps unlimited) communications between them1. To see that this interpretation must
be incorrect, consider the formula D{1,2}(p∧¬K1p). In this formula, DGϕ and Kiϕ mean that ϕ is
distributed knowledge in the group G, and individual knowledge of agent i, respectively. Thus, the
formula says that it is distributed knowledge among agents 1 and 2 that p is true and that agent 1 does
not know p. This formula is consistent (also when we assume that knowledge has the S5 properties).
However, it is not possible that agents 1 and 2 both can get to know that p is true and that agent 1
1Some examples of informal descriptions of distributed knowledge from the literature include “A group has distributed
knowledge of a fact ϕ if the knowledge of ϕ is distributed among its members, so that by pooling their knowledge together
the members of the group can deduce ϕ” [6]; “.. it should be possible for the members of the group to establish ϕ through
communication” [12, 10]; “.. the knowledge that would result of the agents could somehow ’combine’ their knowledge” [12].
These descriptions can at least give a reader the impression that distributed knowledge is about internal communication in the
group of agents.
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does not know that p is true (assuming the S5 properties of knowledge), no matter how much they
communicate (or “pool” their knowledge). The “problem” here is that in a formula DGψ , ψ describes
the possible states of the world as they were before any communication or other events took place, so
a more accurate reading of D{1,2}(p∧¬K1p) would perhaps be that it follows from the combination
of 1 and 2’s knowledge that p∧¬K1p were true before any communication or other events took place.
More technically, the “problem” is due to the standard compositional semantics of modal logic: in the
evaluation of DGϕ , the DG operator picks out a number of states considered possible by the group G
(actually the states considered possible by all members of the group), and then ϕ is evaluated in each of
these states in the original model, without any effect of the DG operator.
But we don’t really consider this a problem. There are other interpretations of distributed knowledge
where the consistency of the mentioned formula makes perfect sense, such that distributed knowledge
being the knowledge of a third party, someone “outside the system” who somehow has access to the
epistemic states of the group members. It shows, however, that it does not make sense to interpret
distributed knowledge as something that is true after the agents in the group have communicated with
each other – with the standard semantics.
In this paper we introduce and study an alternative group modality RG, where RGϕ means (roughly
speaking) that ϕ is true after the agents in the group have shared all their information with each other.
We call that resolving distributed knowledge, and the RG operators are called resolution operators.
Semantically, we say that an expression RGϕ is true iff ϕ is true in what van Benthem [11, p. 249]
calls (G’s) communication core; the model update obtained by removing links to states for members of
G that are not linked by all members of G. See Fig. 1 for an illustration.
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Figure 1: Example taken from [11, p. 248]. Model on the left, its communication core (for the set of all
agents {1,2}) on the right. Reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity are implicitly assumed.
In this paper we capture that model transformation by the new resolution operators, and study re-
sulting logics. For example, the formula R{1,2}(p∧¬K1p) will be inconsistent in the resulting logics.
R{1,2}(p∧K1p) is true in state t in the model in Fig. 1.
This model transformation abstracts away from the issue of how the agents share their information;
whether they communicate directly with each other and if so in which language, whether they are in-
formed by some outsider about the information other agents have and if so how, and so on. As noted by
van Benthem [11, p. 249], the communication core cannot always be obtained by public announcements
using the epistemic language. Similarly, as noted by several researchers [12, 7, 10], standard distributed
knowledge does not always follow logically from the knowledge of the individual agents expressible in
the epistemic language. Our model, like that of standard distributed knowledge, is purely semantic: we
assume that if an agent can discern between two different worlds, then there exists some mechanism that
results in other members of the group being able to make the same distinction. This is further discussed
Section 5.
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This model transformation models a particular kind of internal group information sharing event.
Exactly which kind depends on what we assume about what other agents, i.e., agents that are not in the
group G that resolve their knowledge, know about the fact that this event is taking place. In this paper we
will assume that it is common knowledge among the other agents that G resolve their knowledge – but
not what the agents in G actually learn. This corresponds to a natural class of events: publicly observable
private resolution of distributed knowledge. An example is a meeting in a closed room, where it is
observed that a certain group meets in the room to share information.
We want to make it clear that we do not consider distributed knowledge with standard semantics to be
“wrong”; the important thing is to be clear about its meaning. In particular, the resolution operators are
not intended as a “replacement” of distributed knowledge operators, but as a complement: they express
different things. The logics we study contains both types of operators, as well as common knowledge.
The main results are sound and complete axiomatizations.
Technically, the model transformation, which amounts to removing certain edges, is similar to those
found in the simplest dynamic epistemic logics [5] such as public announcement logics [9]. [11] has also
pointed out the close connection between the communication core and sequences of public announce-
ments. Public announcement logics with distributed knowledge have been studied recently [13]. In the
absence of common knowledge, we get reduction axioms for public announcement logic with distributed
knowledge. This turns out to be the case for resolution operators as well. It is not the case in the presence
of common knowledge, however.
There is a close connection between the communication core and common knowledge [11]. By
studying complete axiomatizations of logics with the resolution operators we make some aspects of
that connection precise and give an answer to the question “when does distributed knowledge become
common knowledge?” – under certain assumptions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review some background def-
initions and results from the literature, before we introduce logics with the new resolution operators in
Section 3, where we also look at some properties of the operators. In Section 4 we prove completeness of
resulting logics; the most interesting case being epistemic logic with common and distributed knowledge
and resolution operators. We discuss related and future work and conclude in Section 5.
2 Background
In this section we give a (necessarily brief) review of the main background concepts from the literature.
We henceforth assume a countable set of propositional variables PROP and a finite set of agents AG.
We let GR be the set of all non-empty groups, i.e., GR =℘(AG)\ /0.
An epistemic model over PROP and AG (or just a model)M= (S,∼,V ) where S is a set of states (or
worlds), V : PROP→ 2S associates a set of states V (p) with each propositional variable p, and ∼ is a
function that maps each agent to a binary equivalence relation on S. We write ∼i for ∼(i).
s ∼i t means that agent i cannot discern between states s and t – if we are in s she doesn’t know
whether we are in t, and vice versa. Considering the distributed knowledge of a group G – a key concept
in the following – we define a derived relation ∼G=⋂a∈G ∼a (it is easy to see that ∼G is an equivalence
relation). Intuitively, someone who has all the knowledge of all the members of G can discern between
two states if and only if at least one member of G can discern between them. We will also consider
common knowledge. A similar relation modeling the common knowledge of a group is obtained by
taking the transitive closure of the union of the individual relations: vCG= (
⋃
i∈G ∼i)∗.
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Definition 1 Below are several languages from the literature.
(ELD) ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | Kiϕ | DGϕ
(ELCD) ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | Kiϕ | DGϕ |CGϕ
(PACD) ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | Kiϕ | DGϕ |CGϕ | [ϕ]ϕ,
where p ∈ PROP, i ∈ AG and G ∈ GR. We use the usual propositional derived operators, as well as EGϕ
for
∧
i∈GKiϕ .
ELD and ELCD are static epistemic languages with distributed knowledge, and with distributed and
common knowledge, respectively. These are the languages we will extend with resolution operators in
the next section. We will also be interested in PACD, the language for public announcement logic with
both common knowledge and distributed knowledge, when we look at completeness proofs.
Satisfaction of a formula ϕ of any of these languages in a state m of a modelM, denotedM,m |= ϕ ,
is defined recursively by the following clauses:
M,m |= p iff m ∈V (p)
M,m |= ¬ϕ iff M,m 6|= ϕ
M,m |= ϕ ∧ψ iff M,m |= ϕ &M,m |= ψ
M,m |= Kaϕ iff ∀n ∈ S. (m∼a n⇒M,n |= ϕ)
M,m |= DGϕ iff ∀n ∈ S. (m∼G n⇒M,n |= ϕ)
M,m |=CGϕ iff ∀n ∈ S. (m(⋃i∈G ∼i)∗n⇒M,n |= ϕ)
M,m |= [ψ]ϕ iff M,m |= ψ ⇒M|ψ,m |= ϕ.
where R∗ denotes the transitive closure of R andM|ψ is the submodel ofM restricted to {m∈M |M,m |=
ψ}. Validity is defined as usual: |= ϕ means thatM,m |= ϕ for allM and m.
We now define some axiom schemata and rules. The classical “S5” proof system for multi-agent
epistemic logic, denoted (S5), consists of the following axioms and rules:
(PC) instances of tautologies
(K) Ki(ϕ → ψ)→ (Kiϕ → Kiψ)
(T) Kiϕ → ϕ
(4) Kiϕ → KiKiϕ
(5) ¬Kiϕ → Ki¬Kiϕ
(MP) from ϕ and ϕ → ψ infer ψ
(N) from ϕ infer Kiϕ .
Axioms for distributed knowledge, denoted (DK):
(KD) DG(ϕ → ψ)→ (DGϕ → DGψ)
(TD) DGϕ → ϕ
(5D) ¬DGϕ → DG¬DGϕ
(D1) Kiϕ ↔ Diϕ
(D2) DGϕ → DHϕ , if G⊆ H.
Axioms and rules for common knowledge, denoted (CK):
(KC) CG(ϕ → ψ)→ (CGϕ →CGψ)
(TC) CGϕ → ϕ
(C1) CGϕ → EGCGϕ
(C2) CG(ϕ → EGϕ)→ (ϕ →CGϕ)
(NC) from ϕ infer CGϕ .
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The system that consists of (S5) and (DK) over the language ELD, denoted S5D, is a sound and
complete axiomatization of all ELD validities. The system that consists of (S5), (DK) and (CK) over
the language ELCD is a sound and complete axiomatization of all ELCD validities.
3 Resolving Distributed Knowledge
We want to model the event that G resolves their knowledge. An immediate question is: whenever the
group G is a proper subset of the set of all agents, what do the other agents know about the fact that this
event takes place? Here we will model situations where it is common knowledge among the other agents
that the event takes place, but not what the members of the group learn. As discussed in the introduction,
this corresponds to a natural class of information sharing events, namely publicly observable private
communication, such as a meeting in a closed room that is observed to be taking place. This is captured
by a global model update: in every state, remove a link to another state for any member of G whenever
it is not the case that there is a link to that state for all members of G.
Formally, given a model M = (S,∼,V ) and a group of agents G, the (global) G-resolved update of
M is the modelM|G whereM|G = (S,∼|G,V ) and
(∼|G)i =
{ ⋂
j∈G ∼ j, i ∈ G,
∼i, otherwise.
We consider the following new languages with resolution operators.
Definition 2 (Languages)
(RD) ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | Kiϕ | DGϕ | RGϕ
(RCD) ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | Kiϕ | DGϕ |CGϕ | RGϕ,
where p ∈ PROP, i ∈ AG and G ∈ GR.
The interpretation of these languages in a pointed model is defined as usual, with the following
additional clause for the resolution operator:
M,s |= RGϕ iff M|G,s |= ϕ.
A couple of observations. Recall that we write ∼H for ⋂i∈H ∼i. Thus,
(∼|G)i =
{∼G, i ∈ G,
∼i, i /∈ G. (∼|G)H =
{∼H , G∩H = /0,
∼G∪H , G∩H 6= /0.
Also note that (∼|G)i = (∼|G){i}.
3.1 Some Validities
Let us start with a trivial validity: resolution has no effect for a singleton coalition.
Proposition 1 The following is valid, where i ∈ AG and ϕ ∈RCD: R{i}ϕ ↔ ϕ .
More interesting are the following properties.
Proposition 2 (Reduction Principles) The following are valid, where G,H ∈ GR, p ∈ PROP and ϕ ∈
RCD:
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1. RGp↔ p
2. RG(ϕ ∧ψ)↔ RGϕ ∧RGψ
3. RG¬ϕ ↔¬RGϕ
4. RGKiϕ ↔ DGRGϕ , when i ∈ G
5. RGKiϕ ↔ KiRGϕ , when i 6∈ G
6. RGDHϕ ↔ DG∪HRGϕ , when G∩H 6= /0
7. RGDHϕ ↔ DHRGϕ , when G∩H = /0.
These properties are reduction principles, of the type known from public announcement logic: they
allow us to simplify expressions involving resolution operators. If we have such principles for the com-
bination of resolution with all other operators we can eliminate resolution operators altogether. There
are two cases missing above: RGCH and RGRH2. We consider them next.
3.1.1 Common Knowledge
First, after the grand coalition have resolved their knowledge, then all the distributed information in
the system is common knowledge: there is no longer a distinction between distributed and common
knowledge:
Proposition 3 For any ϕ ∈RCD: RAGCAGϕ ↔ RAGDAGϕ .
PROOF 3. Given a modelM= (S,∼,V ) and s ∈ S,
M,s |= RAGCAGϕ
iff M|AG,s |=CAGϕ
iff ∀t ∈ S. (s(∼|AG)CAGt⇒M|AG,s |= ϕ)
iff ∀t ∈ S. (s∼AG t⇒M|AG,s |= ϕ) (†)
iff M|AG,s |= DAGϕ
iff M,s |= RAGDAGϕ,
where for (†) we show that (∼|AG)CAG =∼AG. This is easy: by definition we can verify that for all i ∈ AG,
(∼|AG)i =∼AG; hence (∼|AG)CAG = (
⋃
i∈AG(∼|AG)i)∗ = (∼AG)∗ =∼AG.
For the general case, as in the case of distributed knowledge, we have that the resolution operators
and common knowledge operators commute when the groups are disjoint:
Proposition 4 Let i be an agent, G and H groups of agents and ϕ ∈RCD. The following hold:
1. If G∩H = /0, then |= RGCHϕ ↔CHRGϕ
2. If G⊇ H and i ∈ G, then |= RGCHϕ ↔ RGKiϕ ↔ DGRGϕ .
PROOF See the appendix.
However, this does not hold for overlapping groups G and H. In general, we have that (see the
proof of the proposition above)M,s |= RGCHϕ iffM|G, t |= ϕ for any (s, t) ∈∼∗′H , where ∼∗
′
H= (
⋂
i∈G ∼i
∪⋃i∈H\G ∼i)∗. This does not seem to be reducible.
2The lack of a reduction axiom for the general RGRHϕ case does not mean we cannot get a reduction in the languageRD:
we can simply do the reduction “inside-out”.
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3.1.2 Iterated resolution
What about RGRHϕ? In extreme cases, we have:
Proposition 5 The following are valid, where G,H ∈ GR and ϕ ∈RCD:
1. RGRHϕ ↔ RHRGϕ , if G∩H = /0
2. RGRGϕ ↔ RGϕ .
However, in the general case there does not seem to be a reduction axiom in this case. In particular,
RGRHϕ is not equivalent to RG∪Hϕ .
Let us consider an example of iterated resolution.
Example 1 (Triple update) LetM= (S,∼,V ) and
M|G1 |G2 |G3 = (S,∼|G1 |G2 |G3 ,V ). For any agent i, for any number x, we write Gx for “i ∈Gx”, and Gx for
“i /∈ Gx”. Then
(∼|G1 |G2 |G3)i =

if G1G2G3 : ∼i
if G1G2G3 : ∼G1
if G1G2G3
{
G1∩G2 = /0 :
G1∩G2 6= /0 :
∼G2
∼G1∪G2
if G1G2G3 : ∼G1∪G2
if G1G2G3 : ∼G3
if G1G2G3 : ∼G1∪G3
if G1G2G3
{
G1∩G2 = /0 :
G1∩G2 6= /0 :
∼G2∪G3
∼G1∪G2∪G3
if G1G2G3 : ∼G1∪G2∪G3
In general we get the following (the proof is straightforward from the semantic definition).
Proposition 6 Let M = (S,∼,V ) and M|G1 | · · · |Gn = (S,∼|G1 | · · · |Gn ,V ). Then, following the notation of
Example 1, for any i ∈ AG,
(∼|G1 | · · · |Gn)i =

∼i, if G1 · · ·Gn
∼G1∪Θ, if starting with G1G2 and
G1∩G2 6= /0
∼Θ, otherwise
where Θ is the union of all Gx such that i ∈ Gx.
3.2 Reduction Normal Form for Individual and Distributed Knowledge
As we see from the previous section, the reduction axioms for individual knowledge and distributed
knowledge both contain two distinct cases, and the principles of iterated resolution become more com-
plicated. In this section we give a unique form for such reductions, which will be of use later when we
prove completeness. We shall call it reduction normal form for individual and distributed knowledge.
Definition 3 (δ function) Given an agent i, a group H, and a sequence of groups G1, . . . ,Gn, we define
a function δ as follows:
δ0 =
{
Gn∪H, Gn∩H 6= /0
H, Gn∩H = /0
δx =
{
Gn−x∪δx−1, Gn−x∩δx−1 6= /0
δx−1, Gn−x∩δx−1 = /0
δ (H,G1, . . . ,Gn) = δn.
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Clearly δ (H,G1, . . . ,Gn)⊆ H ∪G1∪ ·· ·∪Gn. We simply write δ instead of δ (H,G1, . . . ,Gn) when
its parameters are clear in the context.
Proposition 7 Let i ∈ AG, G1, . . . ,Gn,H ∈ GR, M = (S,∼,V ) and M|G1 | · · · |Gn = (S,∼|G1 | · · · |Gn ,V ).
Then,
1. |= RG1 · · ·RGnKiϕ ↔ Dδ ({i},G1,...,Gn)RG1 · · ·RGnϕ;
2. |= RG1 · · ·RGnDHϕ ↔ Dδ (H,G1,...,Gn)RG1 · · ·RGnϕ;
3. (∼|G1 | · · · |Gn)i =∼δ ({i},G1,...,Gn);
4. (∼|G1 | · · · |Gn)H =∼δ (H,G1,...,Gn).
PROOF Straightforward: the recursive steps in the definition of the δ function matches exactly the re-
duction axioms. Note that clauses 1 and 3 can be treated as special cases of clauses 2 and 4 respectively.
4 Axiomatizations
We construct sound and complete axiomatizations of the logics for the two languagesRD andRCD.
4.1 Resolution and Distributed Knowledge
Consider the language RD. Let RD be the system defined in Figure 2, where (S5) and (DK) are found
in Section 2 and (RR) stands for the following reduction axioms for resolution:
(RA) RGp↔ p
(RC) RG(ϕ ∧ψ)↔ RGϕ ∧RGψ
(RN) RG¬ϕ ↔¬RGϕ
(RD1) RGDHϕ ↔ DG∪HRGϕ , if G∩H 6= /0
(RD2) RGDHϕ ↔ DHRGϕ , if G∩H = /0.
Note that (RR) contains most of the validities in Proposition 2, except for the reduction principles for
individual knowledge – they are provable with RD1, RD2 and D1. In addition, we need the rule NR
for making a reduction to S5D. With the rule NR we can easily show that the rule of Replacement of
Equivalents (RoE) is admissible in RD. RoE allows us to carry out a reduction even without having a
reduction axiom for iterated resolution.
(S5) classical proof system for multi-agent epistemic logic
(DK) characterization axioms for distributed knowledge
(RR) reduction axioms for resolution
(NR) from ϕ infer RGϕ
Figure 2: Axiomatization RD.
Theorem 1 AnyRD formula is valid if and only if it is provable in RD.
4.2 Resolution, Distributed and Common Knowledge
Consider the languageRCD. Let RCD be the system defined in Figure 3, which extends RD with (CK),
found in Section 2, and an induction rule for resolved common knowledge (RRC).
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(S5) classical proof system for multi-agent epistemic logic
(CK) axioms and rules for common knowledge
(DK) characterization axioms for distributed knowledge
(NR) from ϕ infer RGϕ
(RR) reduction axioms for resolution
(RRC) from ϕ → (EHϕ ∧RG1 · · ·RGnψ) infer
ϕ → RG1 · · ·RGnCHψ
Figure 3: Axiomatization RCD
4.2.1 Soundness
For soundness it suffices to show that the rule RRC preserves validity (we know that the other ax-
ioms/rules are valid/validity preserving from soundness results for the logics based on the sublanguages
ofRCD).
Lemma 1 (RRC-validity preservation) For all RCD formulas ϕ and ψ , all G1, . . . ,Gn,H ∈ GR, if |=
ϕ → (EHϕ ∧RG1 · · ·RGnψ), then |= ϕ → RG1 · · ·RGnCHψ .
PROOF Suppose |= ϕ → (EHϕ ∧RG1 · · ·RGnψ). Given a model M and a state s, suppose M,s |= ϕ ,
we must show that M,s |= RG1 · · ·RGnCHψ , i.e., M|G1 | · · · |Gn ,s |= CHψ . Thus, for all H-paths s0(∼
|G1 | · · · |Gn)i0 · · ·(∼ |G1 | · · · |Gn)ix−1sx, where s= s0, we need to show thatM|G1 | · · · |Gn ,sx |= ψ .
From |= ϕ → (EHϕ ∧RG1 · · ·RGnψ) and M,s0 |= ϕ we get M,s0 |= (EHϕ ∧RG1 · · ·RGnψ), which
entails:
M,s1 |= ϕ and M|G1 | · · · |Gn ,s0 |= ψ.
FromM,s1 |= ϕ we getM,s1 |= (EHϕ ∧RG1 · · ·RGnψ), which entails:
M,s2 |= ϕ and M|G1 | · · · |Gn ,s1 |= ψ.
By similar reasoning, for all y= 0, . . . ,x, we have
M,sy |= ϕ and M|G1 | · · · |Gn ,sy |= ψ,
which entailsM|G1 | · · · |Gn ,sx |= ψ as we wish to show.
Corollary 1 (Soundness) For anyRCD formula ϕ , if ϕ is provable in RCD, then it is valid.
4.2.2 Completeness
As already discussed, RCD is similar to PACD (axiomatization for public announcement logic with
common and distributed knowledge; see [13]): both logics extend epistemic logic with common and
distributed knowledge with dynamic operators with update semantics that remove states. There does not
seem, however, to be a trivial relationship between the two types of dynamic operators. We are never-
theless able to make heavy use of the completeness proof of PACD in [13] when proving completeness
of RCD. That proof is again based on the completeness proof for public announcement logic with (only)
common knowledge found in [2, 5], extended to deal with the distributed knowledge operators (which is
non-trivial since intersection is not modally definable). In the following completeness proof we tweak
the PACD proof to deal with resolution operators instead of public announcement operators. The gen-
eral proof strategy is as follows: define a finite canonical pseudo model, where distributed knowledge
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operators are taken as primitive, and then transform it to a proper model while preserving truth. For the
last step we can use a transformation based on unraveling and folding in [13] directly.
The most important difference to the PACD completeness proof in [13], and indeed the crux of the
proof, is the use of the induction rule for resolved common knowledge (RRC). No corresponding rule is
needed in the PACD completeness proof. The rule is used in the proof of Lemma 3(8).
Pseudo Semantics
Definition 4 (Pre-models[13]) A pre-model is a tupleM= (S,v,V ) where:
• S is a non-empty set of states;
• v is a function which maps every agent and every non-empty group of agents to an equivalence
relation; we write vi and vG for v(i) and v(G) respectively;
• V : PROP→℘(S) is a valuation.
vCG is defined as the reflexive transitive closure of
⋃
i∈G vi, just as for a model.
A pre-model is technically a model with a bigger set of agents (all groups are treated as agents in a
pre-model). More precisely, if we make the set of agents A explicit in a pre-model, e.g.,M= (A,S,v,V ),
thenM is in fact a “genuine” model (S,v,V ) where the set of agents is A∪ (℘(A)\ /0).
Definition 5 (Pseudo models[13]) A pseudo model is a pre-modelM=(S,v,V ) such that for any agent
i and any groups G and H,
• v{i}=vi, and
• G⊆ H implies vH⊆vG.
A pointed pre-model (resp. pointed pseudo model) is a tuple (M,s) consisted of a pre-model (resp.
pseudo model)M and a state s inM.
Definition 6 (Pseudo semantics) Given a pre-modelM = (S,v,V ), let m be a state in M. Satisfaction
at (M,s) is defined as follows:
M,s |=p p iff s ∈V (p)
M,s |=p ¬ϕ iff M,s 6|=p ϕ
M,s |=p ϕ ∧ψ iff M,s |=p ϕ &M,s |=p ψ
M,s |=p Kiϕ iff (∀t ∈M)(svi n⇒M, t |=p ϕ)
M,s |=p CGϕ iff (∀t ∈M)(svCG t⇒M, t |=p ϕ)
M,s |=p DGϕ iff (∀t ∈M)(svG t⇒M, t |=p ϕ)
M,s |=p RGψ iff M|G,s |=p ϕ,
whereM|G = (S,v|G,V ) such that
(v|G)i =
{
vG, i ∈ G
vi, i /∈ G and (v|G)H =
{
vH∪G, H ∩G 6= /0
vH , H ∩G= /0
Satisfaction in a pre-model M (denoted by M |=p ϕ) is defined as usual. We use |=p ϕ to denote
validity, i.e. M,s |=p ϕ for any pointed pre-model (M,s). We write |= instead of |=p when there is no
confusion.
Proposition 8 LetM be a pseudo model, G a group of agents. ThenM|G is a pseudo model.
PROOF See the appendix.
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Proposition 9 Propositions 6 and 7 still hold for pseudo models.
When we regard a pre-model as a genuine model, classical (individual) bisimulation becomes an
invariance relation. To make this clear, we first elaborate the definition of bisimulation for pre-models,
and then introduce its invariance results.
Definition 7 (Pre-model bisimulation) Let two pre-models M = (S,v,V ) and M′ = (S′,v′,V ′) be
given. A non-empty relation Z⊆ S×S′ is called a bisimulation betweenM andM′, denoted byMM′,
if for all τ ∈ AG∪GR, all s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′ such that sZs′, the following hold.
(at) For all p ∈ PROP, s ∈V (p) iff s′ ∈V ′(p);
(zig) For all t ∈ S, if s∼τ t, there is a t ′ ∈ S′ such that s′ ∼′τ t ′ and tZt ′;
(zag) For all t ′ ∈ S′, if s′ ∼′τ t ′, there is a t ∈ S such that s∼τ t and tZt ′.
We say that pointed pre-models (M,s) and (M′,s′) are bisimilar, denoted (M,s) (M′,s′), if there is
a bisimulation Z betweenM andM′ linking s and s′.
Proposition 10Resolution preserves pre-model bisimulation. I.e., for all pointed pre-models (M,s) and
(M′,s′), if (M,s) (M′,s′) then (M|G,s) (M′|G,s′).
PROOF See the appendix.
Corollary 2 For any pre-modelsM andM′, if (M,s) (M′,s′) thenM,s |=p ϕ iffM′,s′ |=p ϕ for any
RCD formula ϕ .
As introduced in [13], we can also consider a kind of bisimulations between genuine models and
pre-models.
Definition 8 (Trans-bisimulation [13]) Let a modelM= (M,∼,V ) and a pre-model N= (N,v,ν) be
given. A non-empty binary relation Z ⊆M×N is called a trans-bisimulation betweenM and N, if for
all m ∈M and n ∈ N with mZn:
(at) m ∈V (p) iff n ∈ ν(p) for all p ∈ PROP,
(zigag) For all m′ ∈M and all i ∈ AG, if m ∼i m′ (and so m ∼{i} m′), then there is an n′ ∈ N such that
m′Zn′ and nvτ0 · · ·vτx n′ with each of τ0, . . . ,τx being “i” or “G” such that i ∈ G;
(ziggr) For all m′ ∈M and all G ∈ GR with |G| ≥ 2, if m∼G m′, then there is an n′ ∈ N such that m′Zn′
and nvG1 · · ·vGx n′ with G⊆ G1∩·· ·∩Gx;
(zag) For all n′ ∈N and all τ ∈ AG∪GR, if nvτ n′, then there is an m′ ∈M such that m′Zn′ and m∼τ m′.
We write Z : (M,m)T (N,n) if Z is a trans-bisimulation betweenM andN linking m and n. We say a
pointed model (M,m) and a pointed pre-model (N,n) are trans-bisimilar, denoted by (M,m)T (N,n),
if there is a trans-bisimulation Z such that Z : (M,m)T (N,n).
To make the notation symmetric, we call Z a trans-bisimulation between N andM if it is a trans-
bisimulation betweenM and N, and we regard Z : (N,n)T (M,m) just as Z : (M,m)T (N,n).
(Pseudo) satisfaction of RCD formulas is invariant under trans-bisimulation. We will not prove that
directly at this point: it follows from a stronger result we prove later (Lemma 6).
Theorem 2 (Pseudo soundness) All theorems of RCD are valid in the class of all pseudo models.
PROOF See the appendix.
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Finitary Canonical Models
Definition 9 (Closure) Given a formula ϕ , the closure of ϕ is given by the function cl : RCD →
℘(RCD) which is defined as follows:
1. ϕ ∈ cl(ϕ), and if ψ ∈ cl(ϕ), so are all of its subformulas;
2. If ϕ is not a negation, then ϕ ∈ cl(ϕ) implies ¬ϕ ∈ cl(ϕ);
3. Kiψ ∈ cl(ϕ) iff D{i}ψ ∈ cl(ϕ);
4. CGψ ∈ cl(ϕ) implies {KiCGψ | a ∈ A} ⊆ cl(ϕ);
5. RG1 · · ·RGn¬ψ ∈ cl(ϕ) implies RG1 · · ·RGnψ ∈ cl(ϕ);
6. RG1 · · ·RGn(ψ ∧χ) ∈ cl(ϕ) implies {RG1 · · ·RGnψ,RG1 · · ·RGnχ} ⊆ cl(ϕ);
7. RG1 · · ·RGnKiψ ∈ cl(ϕ) implies Dδ ({i},G1,...,Gn)RG1 · · ·RGnψ ∈ cl(ϕ);
8. RG1 · · ·RGnDHψ ∈ cl(ϕ) implies Dδ (H,G1,...,Gn)RG1 · · ·RGnψ ∈ cl(ϕ);
9. RG1 · · ·RGnCHψ ∈ cl(ϕ) implies all of the following:
• Dδ (H,G1,...,Gn)RG1 · · ·RGnCHψ ∈ cl(ϕ),
• {Dδ ({i},G1,...,Gn)RG1 · · ·RGnCHψ | i ∈ H} ⊆ cl(ϕ),
• RG1 · · ·RGnψ ∈ cl(ϕ).
It is not hard to verify that the closure of a formula is finite.
We use Γ as shorthand for
∧
ϕ∈Γϕ when Γ is a finite set of formulas.
Definition 10 (Canonical pseudo model) Let α be a formula. The canonical pseudo modelMc= (S,v
,V ) for cl(α) is defined below:
• S= {Γ | Γ is maximal consistent in cl(α)};
• Γvi ∆ iff {Kiϕ | Kiϕ ∈ Γ}= {Kiϕ | Kiϕ ∈ ∆};
• ΓvG ∆ iff {DHϕ | DHϕ ∈ Γ}= {DHϕ | DHϕ ∈ ∆} whenever H ⊆ G;
• V (p) = {Γ ∈ S | p ∈ Γ}.
Proposition 11 The canonical pseudo model for any cl(α) is a pseudo model.
PROOF See the appendix.
Lemma 2 Let S = {Γ | Γ is maximal consistent in cl(α)} with α a formula. It holds that `∨Γ∈S Γ and
` ϕ ↔∨ϕ∈Γ∈S Γ for all ϕ ∈ cl(α).
PROOF See [5, Exercise 7.16] for the first result (although cl(α) is different in our case the proof is
exactly the same). We give a proof of the second result in the appendix.
Let (S,v|G1 | · · · |Gn ,V ) be an update of a canonical pseudo model, and P = 〈Φ0 τ0 · · · τn−1 Φn〉
where stands forv|G1 | · · · |Gn and every τx is an agent or a group. If all agents in τ0, . . . ,τn−1 appears in
H, we callP a 〈G1 · · ·Gn〉-resolved H-path (fromΦ0); if a formula ϕ is such that ϕ ∈Φi for all 0≤ i≤ n,
we call P a canonical ϕ-path.
Lemma 3 If Γ and ∆ are maximal consistent in cl(α), then
1. Γ is deductively closed in cl(α), i.e., Γ ` ϕ ⇔ ϕ ∈ Γ for any ϕ ∈ cl(α);
2. If ¬ϕ ∈ cl(α), then ϕ ∈ Γ⇔¬ϕ /∈ Γ;
3. If ϕ ∧ψ ∈ cl(α), then ϕ ∧ψ ∈ Γ⇔ ϕ ∈ Γ & ψ ∈ Γ;
4. If Γ∧ Kˆi∆ is consistent, Γvi ∆; if Γ∧ DˆG∆ is consistent, ΓvG ∆;
5. If Kiϕ ∈ cl(α), then KiΓ ` ϕ ⇔ KiΓ ` Kiϕ;
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6. If DGϕ ∈ cl(α), then DGΓ ` ϕ ⇔ DGΓ ` DGϕ;
7. If CGϕ ∈ cl(α), then CGϕ ∈ Γ⇔∀∆(ΓvCG ∆⇒ ϕ ∈ ∆);
8. If RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ ∈ cl(α), then RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ ∈ Γ iff every 〈G1 · · ·Gn〉-resolved H-path from Γ is a
canonical RG1 · · ·RGnϕ-path.
PROOF We give the proof of the clause 8 in the appendix. Other clauses are the same as in [13, Lemma
49] which can be traced back to [5, Chapter 7].
Lemma 4 (Pseudo truth) LetMc = (S,v,V ) be the canonical pseudo model for cl(α). For all groups
G1, . . . ,Gn, all Γ ∈ S, and all RG1 · · ·RGnϕ ∈ cl(α), it holds that
RG1 · · ·RGnϕ ∈ Γ iff Mc|G1 | · · · |Gn ,Γ |= ϕ.
PROOF We show this lemma by induction on ϕ .
• The base case. RG1 · · ·RGn p ∈ Γ iff p ∈ Γ (Proposition 2(1)) iff Mc,Γ |= p iff Mc,Γ |= RG1 · · ·RGn p
iffMc|G1 | · · · |Gn ,Γ |= p.
• The case for negation. RG1 · · ·RGn¬ψ ∈ Γ iff ¬RG1 · · ·RGnψ ∈ Γ (note that ¬RG1 · · ·RGnψ ∈ cl(α) by
Definition 9(2,5)) iff RG1 · · ·RGnψ /∈ Γ iffMc|G1 | · · · |Gn ,Γ 6|= ψ iffMc|G1 | · · · |Gn ,Γ |= ¬ψ .
• The case for conjunction. RG1 · · ·RGn(ψ ∧χ) ∈ Γ iff (RG1 · · ·RGnψ ∧RG1 · · ·RGnχ) ∈ Γ
iff {RG1 · · ·RGnψ,RG1 · · ·RGnχ} ⊆ Γ (RG1 · · ·RGnψ and RG1 · · ·RGnχ are in cl(α))
iffMc|G1 | · · · |Gn ,Γ |= ψ andMc|G1 | · · · |Gn ,Γ |= χ iffMc|G1 | · · · |Gn ,Γ |= ψ ∧χ .
• The case for individual knowledge. From left to right.
RG1 · · ·RGnKiψ ∈ Γ
iff DδRG1 · · ·RGnψ ∈ Γ where δ = δ ({i},G1, . . . ,Gn)
iff ∀∆.(Γvδ ∆⇒ DδRG1 · · ·RGnψ ∈ ∆)
⇒ ∀∆.(Γvδ ∆⇒ RG1 · · ·RGnψ ∈ ∆) (TD)
iff ∀∆.(Γvδ ∆⇒Mc|G1 | · · · |Gn ,∆ |= ψ) (IH)
iff ∀∆.(Γvδ ∆⇒Mc,∆ |= RG1 · · ·RGnψ)
iff Mc,Γ |= DδRG1 · · ·RGnψ
iff Mc,Γ |= RG1 · · ·RGnKiψ (7(1), 9)
iff Mc|G1 | · · · |Gn ,Γ |= Kiψ .
From right to left. Suppose Mc|G1 | · · · |Gn ,Γ |= Kiψ . We must show RG1 · · ·RGnKiψ ∈ Γ. Suppose
this is not the case. Then ¬RG1 · · ·RGnKiψ ∈ Γ. Hence Γ∧¬RG1 · · ·RGnKiψ is consistent, and so is
Γ∧ Dˆδ¬RG1 · · ·RGnψ , where δ = δ ({i},G1, . . . ,Gn). Let S be the set of all maximal consistent sets
in cl(α). By Lemma 2, Γ∧ Dˆδ
∨
¬RG1 ···RGnψ∈Θ∈SΘ is consistent. Since conjunction, resolution and
the Dˆδ -operator all distribute over disjunction,
∨
¬RG1 ···RGnψ∈Θ∈S(Γ∧ DˆδΘ) is consistent. Therefore
there must be a Θ ∈ S such that ¬RG1 · · ·RGnψ ∈Θ and Γ∧ DˆδΘ is consistent.
From ¬RG1 · · ·RGnψ ∈Θ we get RG1 · · ·RGnψ /∈Θ. By the induction hypothesisMc|G1 | · · · |Gn ,Θ 6|=
ψ , and so Mc,Θ 6|= RG1 · · ·RGnψ . By Lemma 3(4) and that Γ∧ DˆδΘ is consistent, Γ vδ Θ. But this
contradicts the supposition that Mc|G1 | · · · |Gn ,Γ |= Kiψ , since by the same reasoning as in the proof
of the other direction (see above),Mc,∆ |= RG1 · · ·RGnψ for all ∆ such that Γvδ ∆.
• The case for distributed knowledge: similar to the case for individual knowledge, and in the proof we
use δ (H,G1, . . . ,Gn) instead of δ ({i},G1, . . . ,Gn).
• The case for common knowledge. RG1 · · ·RGnCHψ ∈ Γ
iff all 〈G1 · · ·Gn〉-resolved H-paths from Γ are also canonical RG1 · · ·RGnψ-paths.
Namely, for all ∆ such that (Γ,∆) ∈ (v|G1 | · · · |Gn)CH , RG1 · · ·RGnψ ∈ ∆
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iff for all ∆ such that (Γ,∆) ∈ (v|G1 | · · · |Gn)CH ,Mc|G1 | · · · |Gn ,∆ |= ψ (by IH)
iffMc|G1 | · · · |Gn ,Γ |=CHψ .
• The case for RHψ . RG1 · · ·RGnRHψ ∈ Γ iffMc|G1 | · · · |Gn |H ,Γ |= ψ (IH applies to ψ)
iffMc|G1 | · · · |Gn ,Γ |= RHψ .
Corollary 3 Let Mc = (S,v,V ) be the canonical pseudo model for cl(α). For all Γ ∈ S and all ϕ ∈
cl(α), it holds that ϕ ∈ Γ iffMc,Γ |= ϕ.
Lemma 5 (Pseudo completeness) Let ϕ be an RCD-formula. If ϕ is valid on all pseudo models, then
it is provable in RCD.
From Pseudo Completeness to Completeness By using unraveling and folding from [13, pp. 9–15],
we can transform the canonical pseudo model to a bisimilar pre-model and then to a trans-bisimilar
proper model. It remains to show that this process preserves truth. We will useT to denote the trans-
bisimulation relation.
Lemma 6 (Invariance of trans-bisimulation) Let (M,m) be a pointed model, (N,n) a pointed pre-
model, and (S,s) a pointed pseudo model. If (M,m)T (N,n) (S,s), thenM,m |= ϕ iff N,n |=p ϕ
for all formulas ϕ .
PROOF The lemma can be shown by induction on ϕ . Here we only show the case for the resolution
operators, proofs of other cases are exactly as in the proof of [13, Lemma 26].
Given a pointed model (M,m), a pointed pre-model (N,n) and a pointed pseudo model (S,s), such
that Z : (M,m)T (N,n) for some Z and (N,n) (S,s), we have the following:
M,m |= RGψ iff M|G,m |= ψ
iff N|G,n |=p ψ (∗)
iff N,n |=p RGψ,
where to show (∗) it is sufficient to show that Z : (M|G,m)T (N|G,n), as (∗) is then guaranteed by
the induction hypothesis (note that (N|G,n) (S|G,s) by Proposition 10). Let M = (M,∼,V ) and
N= (N,v,ν).
• The case for (at) holds by Z : (M,m)T (N,n).
• As for (ziggr), suppose m(∼|G)Hm′ for some m′ ∈M and |H| ≥ 2.
– If G∩H = /0, (∼|G)H =∼H . By Z : (M,m) T (N,n) there is an n′ ∈ N such that m′Zn′ and
n vH0 · · · vHx n′ with H ⊆ H0 ∩ ·· · ∩Hx. Let H0 = · · · = Hx = H. Thus n vH · · · vH n′. Since
(v|G)H =vH , it holds that n(v|G)H · · ·(v|G)Hn′, and so (ziggr) holds in this case.
– If G∩H 6= /0, (∼|G)H =∼G∪H . By Z : (M,m)T (N,n) there is an n′ ∈ N such that m′Zn′ and
n vH0 · · · vHx n′ with G∪H ⊆ H0 ∩ ·· · ∩Hx. Thus n vG∪H · · · vG∪H n′. Since (v|G)H =vG∪H , It
holds that n(v|G)H · · ·(v|G)Hn′. (ziggr) holds also in this case.
• The case for (zigag) is analogous.
• The case for (zag). For all n′ ∈ N and all τ ∈ AG∪GR, if n(v|G)τn′, then we must show that there is
an m′ ∈M such that m′Zn′ and m(∼|G)τm′.
– If τ is an agent i. Then if i ∈ G, (v|G)i =vG, otherwise (v|G)i =vi. By Z : (M,m)T (N,n), we
have m∼G m′ if i ∈ G, or m∼i m′ otherwise. Namely m(∼|G)im′ in either case.
– If τ is a group H. Then if G∩H = /0, (v|G)H =vH , otherwise (v|G)H =vG∪H . By Z : (M,m)T
(N,n), we have m∼H m′ if G∩H = /0, or m∼G∪H m′ otherwise. Namely m(∼|G)Hm′ in either case.
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We have shown that the lemma holds for the case for resolution. For other cases we refer to the proof of
[13, Lemma 26].
Theorem 3 (Completeness) For anyRCD formula ϕ , if ϕ is valid then it is provable in RCD.
PROOF It suffices to show that any RCD-consistent formula is satisfiable. Let ϕ be consistent. LetMc
be the canonical pseudo model for cl(ϕ). By the pseudo truth lemma (with n = 0, i.e., an empty list of
resolution operators), ϕ is satisfied in a state Γ in Mc. Now let NMc be the unraveling [13, Definition
18]3 of Mc. NM
c
is a pre-model [13, Proposition 19]. Now let (NM
c
)∗ be the folding [13, Definition
22] ofNM
c
. (NM
c
)∗ is a (proper) model [13, Definition 22]. From [13, Lemma 27] and [13, Lemma 28]
we have that unraveling preserves bisimulation and that folding preserves trans-bisimulation, in other
words we have that4 (M,Γ) (NMc ,Γ)T ((NMc)∗,Γ). By Corollary 2, (NMc ,Γ) |=p ϕ . By Lemma
6, ((NM
c
)∗,Γ) |= ϕ and we are done.
5 Discussion
In this paper we captured the dynamics of publicly observable private resolution of distributed knowl-
edge. Resolution operators (using update semantics) are both an alternative and a complement to the
standard distributed knowledge operators (which use standard modal semantics).
Resolution operators let us reason about the relationship between common knowledge and distributed
knowledge in general, and in particular about distributed knowledge as potential common knowledge –
when can distributed knowledge become common knowledge? A naive idea would be that DGϕ should
imply that RGCGϕ – any information that is distributed can become common knowledge through reso-
lution. This does not hold in general, however, due to Moore-like phenomena – ϕ might even become
false after resolution (an example is the formula D{1,2}(p∧¬K1p) discussed in the introduction). We do,
however, have the following (Prop. 4(2) with G= H):
RGCGϕ ↔ DGRGϕ.
A fact can become common knowledge after the group have shared their information if and only if it
was distributed knowledge before the event that the fact would be true after the event. This is exactly the
distributed knowledge that can become common knowledge (in our special case of publicly observable
private resolution of distributed knowledge). If the grand coalition resolves its distributed knowledge,
there is no distinction between distributed and common knowledge any more: RAGCAGϕ ↔ RAGDAGϕ
(Prop. 3).
As discussed in the introduction, it has been argued that distributed knowledge in general does not
comply with the following principle of full communication [12]: if DGϕ is true, then ϕ follows logically
from the set of all formulas known by at least one agent in the group. This is seen as a problem: namely
that agents can have distributed knowledge without being able to establish it “through communication”
[12]. Several papers [12, 7, 10] have tried to characterize classes of models on which the principle
of full communication does hold – the class of all such models is called full communication models
[10]. This may seem related to the distinction between distributed knowledge and resolution operators:
the latter is intuitively related to internal “full” communication in the group. However, this similarity
is superficial: the notion of full communication in the sense of [12] is about expressive power of the
3While unraveling is a standard general technique; here we mean unraveling exactly in the sense of the mentioned definition.
4Here Γ is any path in the unraveling starting with Γ.
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communication language and the limits that puts on the resulting possible epistemic states under certain
assumptions about how information is shared. The key point of the resolution operators, on the other
hand, compared with the standard distributed knowledge operators, is to make a distinction between
before and after the information sharing event. That distinction is not made in standard distributed
knowledge – even restricted to full communication models: it is easy to see that, e.g., D{1,2}(p∧¬K1p) is
satisfiable also on full communication models. The two ideas, of limiting models to full communication
models and of modeling group information sharing events using model updates, are orthogonal, and
there is nothing against restricting logics with the resolution operators to full communication models.
We leave that for future work. Furthermore, it would be interesting to look at a combined variant:
“update by full communication”, which takes the communication language into account when defining
the updated model.
A main interest for future work is expressive power. Can it be shown that RCD is strictly more ex-
pressive than ELCD? Another, related, natural question is the relative expressivity ofRCD and PACD:
can the combination of public announcement operators (which eliminate states) and distributed knowl-
edge operators (which pick out states considered possible by everyone) always be used to “simulate” the
resolution operators (which eliminate states considered possible by everyone)?
Also of interest for future work is to look at other assumptions about the other agents’ knowledge
about the group communication event taking place. In this paper we only studied the case that it is
common knowledge that the event takes place (but not what the agents in the group learn). That was
naturally modeled using a “global” model update: in every state, replace accessibility for each agent in
the group with the group accessibility (intersection). An interesting and also natural alternative is doing
only a “local” model update: change accessibility in the same way, but only in the current state. That
would correspond to it being common knowledge that if this is the current state, then the group resolves
their knowledge.
When looking at the interaction of the resolution and common knowledge operators one might be
reminded of relativized common knowledge [3, 4]. Here is an open question: can RGCHϕ be expressed
using relativized common knowledge, in combination with other operators?
Finally, there is a conceptual relationship to group announcement logic [1], where formulas of the
form 〈G〉ϕ say that G can make a joint public announcement such that ϕ will become true. A differ-
ence to the resolution operators in this paper is that latter model private communication. Yet, the exact
relationship between these operators is interesting for future work.
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A Some proofs
Proof of Proposition 4 1. M,s |= RGCHϕ iffM|G,s |=CHϕ iffM|G, t |= ϕ for any (s, t) ∈∼∗′H , where
∼∗′H= (
⋃
i∈H ∼′i)∗ and ∼′i=
⋂
j∈G ∼ j for i ∈ G and ∼′i=∼i for i 6∈ G. Thus, when G∩H = /0, we get that
∼∗′H= (
⋃
i∈H ∼i)∗. M|G, t |=ϕ for any (s, t)∈ (
⋃
i∈H ∼i)∗ holds iffM, t |=RGϕ for any (s, t)∈ (
⋃
i∈H ∼i)∗
iffM, t |=CHRGϕ .
2.
M,s |= RGCHϕ
iff M|G,s |=CHϕ
iff M|G, t |= ϕ for all t s.t. (s, t) ∈∼GCH
iff † M|G, t |= ϕ for all t s.t. (s, t) ∈∼Gi
iff M|G,s |= Kiϕ
iff M,s |= RGKiϕ
For the † step, note that when i∈G,∼Gi =∼Gj for any j∈G (and actually also equal to∼G). Therefore,
∼GCH= (
⋃
i∈H
∼Gi )∗ = (∼Gi )∗ =∼Gi .
That RGKiϕ ↔ DGRGϕ is valid is already shown in Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 8 LetM= (S,v,V ). ClearlyM|G = (S,v|G,V ) is a pre-model. Moreover,
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1. Given an agent i,
(v|G){i} =
{
v{i}∪G i ∈ G
v{i}, i /∈ G
=
{
vG i ∈ G
vi, i /∈ G
= (v|G)i.
2. Given two groups H and H ′ such that H ⊆ H ′,
(v|G)H ′ =
{
vH ′∪G H ′∩G 6= /0
vH ′ , H ′∩G= /0
(v|G)H =
{
vH∪G H ∩G 6= /0
vH , H ∩G= /0
So we have:
• when H ∩G 6= /0 (and therefore H ′∩G 6= /0), (v|G)H ′ = vH ′∪G ⊆ vH∪G = (v|G)H ;
• when H ′∩G= /0 (and therefore H ∩G= /0), (v|G)H ′ =vH ′⊆vH= (v|G)H ;
• otherwise H ′∩G 6= /0 and H ∩G= /0, and in this case (v|G)H ′ = vH ′∪G ⊆ vH = (v|G)H .
M|G is a pre-model satisfying the two conditions above, which shows it is a pseudo model.
Proof of Proposition 10 LetM=(S,v,V ) andM′=(S′,v′,V ′). ThusM|G=(S,v|G,V ) andM′|G=
(S′,v′|G,V ′). Suppose Z : (M,s) (M′,s′), and we show Z : (M|G,s) (M′|G,s′):
(at) This clearly follows from the (at) clause of Z : (M,s) (M′,s′).
(zig) For all t ∈ S, if s(v|G)Ht, then
– If G∩H = /0, then (v|G)H =vH and (v′|G)H =v′H . By Z : (M,s) (M′,s′) there must be a
t ′ ∈ S′ such that s′(v′|G)Ht ′ and tZt ′.
– If G∩H 6= /0, then (v|G)H =vG∪H and (v′|G)H =v′G∪H . By Z : (M,s) (M′,s′) there must be
a t ′ ∈ S′ such that s′(v′|G)Ht ′ and tZt ′.
If s(v|G)it, we can prove analogously to the above.
(zag) This can be shown analogously to the case for (zig).
Proof of Theorem 2 It is easy to verify that (S5), (CK), (DK), (NR), (RA), (RC) and (RN) are all valid
or admissible with respect to the class of all pseudo models. Here we only show that i) (RD1) and (RD2)
are valid in all pseudo models, and ii) (RRC) preserves validity of pseudo models.
LetM= (S,v,V ) be a pseudo model and s ∈ S. We show the following:
• M,s |=p RD1 andM,s |=p RD2, i.e.,
– If G∩H 6= /0, thenM,s |=p RGDHϕ ↔ DG∪HRGϕ;
– If G∩H = /0, thenM,s |=p RGDHϕ ↔ DHRGϕ .
M,s |=p RGDHϕ
iff M|G,s |=p DHϕ
iff M|G, t |=p ϕ for all t s.t. (s, t) ∈ (v|G)H
iff M, t |=p RGϕ for all t s.t. (s, t) ∈ (v|G)H
iff † if G∩H 6= /0, M, t |=p RGϕ for all t s.t. (s, t) ∈v|G∪H ,
if G∩H = /0, M, t |=p RGϕ for all t s.t. (s, t) ∈v|H
iff if G∩H 6= /0, M, t |=p DG∪HRGϕ, and
if G∩H = /0, M, t |=p DHRGϕ,
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where the † step is by definition:
(v|G)H =
{
vH∪G, G∩H 6= /0,
vH , G∩H = /0.
• M,s |=p ϕ → RG1 · · ·RGnCHψ under the assumption |=p ϕ → (EHϕ ∧RG1 · · ·RGnψ). The proof is
similar to the proof for genuine models.
Proof of Proposition 11 Suppose that M = (S,v,V ) is the canonical pseudo model for cl(α). We
need to show thatM is a pseudo model. Namely,
1. S is non-empty, and
2. all vi’s and vG’s are equivalence relations, and
3. V is a valuation from PROP to℘(S), and
4. vi=v{i} for every agent i, and
5. vH⊆vG if G and H are groups such that G⊆ H.
Conditions 1–3 are the conditions for being a pre-model which are easy to verify. Conditions 4 and 5 are
additional conditions for being a pseudo model.
By Definition 9(3), Kiϕ and Diϕ must be in cl(α) both or neither. Thus, for any Γ,∆ ∈ S,
Γvi ∆
iff {Kiϕ | Kiϕ ∈ Γ}= {Kiϕ | Kiϕ ∈ ∆}
iff {Diϕ | Diϕ ∈ Γ}= {Diϕ | Diϕ ∈ ∆} (Axiom DK1)
iff Γv{i} ∆.
ΓvH ∆
iff {DH ′ϕ | DH ′ϕ ∈ Γ}= {DH ′ϕ | DH ′ϕ ∈ ∆},
for any group H ′ ⊆ H
⇒ {DG′ϕ | DG′ϕ ∈ Γ}= {DG′ϕ | DG′ϕ ∈ ∆},
for any group G′ ⊆ G
iff ΓvG ∆.
This finishes the proof, and shows that the notion “canonical pseudo model” is well-defined.
Proof of Lemma 2(2) Let ϕ ∈ cl(α). By ` (∨¬ϕ∈Γ∈S Γ)→¬ϕ and the first result of this lemma (i.e.,
` ∨¬ϕ∈Γ∈S ∨∨ϕ∈Γ∈S) we get ` ϕ → ∨ϕ∈Γ∈S Γ. For the converse direction, suppose 0 ∨ϕ∈Γ∈S Γ→ ϕ .
Then ¬(∨ϕ∈Γ∈S Γ→ ϕ) is consistent. Namely ¬ϕ ∧∨ϕ∈Γ∈S Γ is consistent. But this is impossible.
Proof of Lemma 3(8) Let RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ ∈ cl(α). It follows from the definition of closure (Definition
9) that the following formulas:
• Dδ ({i},G1,...,Gn)RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ where i ∈ H
• Dδ (H,G1,...,Gn)RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ
• RG1 · · ·RGnϕ and ¬RG1 · · ·RGnϕ
are all in cl(α).
From left to right. Suppose RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ ∈ Γ, we continue by induction on the length of the path
that every 〈G1 · · ·Gn〉-resolved H-path from Γ is a canonical RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ-path. Then the left-to-right
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direction follows: by ` CHϕ → ϕ , NR and RG-distribution (which follows from RR axioms) we get
` RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ → RG1 · · ·RGnϕ , and by RG1 · · ·RGnϕ ∈ cl(α) we have RG1 · · ·RGnϕ ∈ Γ.
Suppose the length of the 〈G1 · · ·Gn〉-resolved H-path is 0, i.e., the path is 〈Γ〉, we must show that
RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ ∈ Γ. This is guaranteed by the supposition.
Suppose the length of the 〈G1 · · ·Gn〉-resolved H-path is n+ 1, i.e., the path is 〈Γ0 τ0 · · · τn−1
Γn τn Γn+1〉 with Γ0 = Γ and every τx is either in H or a subset of H. By the induction hypothesis we
may assume that RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ ∈ Γn.
• Suppose τn is an agent i (i ∈ H). By Axiom C1 we have ` CHϕ → KiCHϕ . It follows that `
RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ → RG1 · · ·RGnKiCHϕ by the rules NR and RG-distribution. Let δ = δ ({i},G1, . . . ,Gn).
By the reduction axioms we move Ki left, i.e., ` RG1 · · ·RGnKiCHϕ → DδRG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ , so we get `
RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ→DδRG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ . Hence Γn `DδRG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ . As DδRG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ ∈ cl(α),
we have DδRG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ ∈ Γn. Moreover, by Proposition 9, i=vδ . Thus DδRG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ ∈
Γn+1 by the definition of vδ , and so RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ ∈ Γn+1.
• Suppose τn is a group I (I ⊆ H). By Axioms C1, D1 and D2 we have ` CHϕ → DICHϕ . By NR
and RG-distribution, ` RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ → RG1 · · ·RGnDICHϕ . By similar reasoning to the case above,
we get the result RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ ∈ Γn+1 (we use δ (H,G1, . . . ,Gn) instead of δ ({i},G1, . . . ,Gn) in this
case).
In both cases we get RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ ∈ Γn+1 as we wish to show.
From right to left. Suppose that every 〈G1 · · ·Gn〉-resolved H-path from Γ is a canonical RG1 · · ·RGnϕ-
path. Let S0 be the set of all maximal consistent sets ∆ in cl(α) such that every 〈G1 · · ·Gn〉-resolved
H-path from ∆ is a canonical RG1 · · ·RGnϕ-path. Now consider the formula
λ =
∨
∆∈S0
∆
We will show the following:
1. ` Γ→ λ
2. ` λ → (EHλ ∧RG1 · · ·RGnϕ).
From the above and the reduction rule for resolved common knowledge we get ` Γ→ RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ
which furthermore entails RG1 · · ·RGnCHϕ ∈ Γ. We now continue with the proof of the two clauses.
1. This is trivial, as Γ is one of the disjuncts of λ .
2. Suppose towards a contradiction that
λ ∧¬(EHλ ∧RG1 · · ·RGnϕ)
is consistent, i.e., λ ∧ (¬EHλ ∨¬RG1 · · ·RGnϕ) is consistent. Because λ is a disjunction there must be a
disjunct Ξ of λ such that Ξ∧ (¬EHλ ∨¬RG1 · · ·RGnϕ) is consistent. It follows that either Ξ∧¬EHλ or
Ξ∧¬RG1 · · ·RGnϕ is consistent.
If the former is consistent, then there must be an agent i ∈ H such that Ξ∧¬Kiλ is consistent, i.e.,
Ξ∧ Kˆi¬∨∆∈S0 ∆ is consistent. Since ` ∨∆∈S ∆ by Lemma 2, we have ` ¬∨∆∈S0 ∆→ ∨∆′∈S\S0 ∆′, and
so there must be a Θ in S \S0 such that Ξ∧ KˆiΘ is consistent. By item 4 of this lemma Ξ vi Θ (where
v is the relation in the canonical pseudo model for cl(α)). But then Ξ cannot be in S0 for Θ /∈ S0. A
contradiction!
If the latter is consistent, since ¬RG1 · · ·RGnϕ ∈ cl(α) and Ξ is maximal, ¬RG1 · · ·RGnϕ ∈ Ξ. But
RG1 · · ·RGnϕ ∈Ξ since ΞvH Ξ and every 〈G1 · · ·Gn〉-resolved H-path from Ξ is a canonical RG1 · · ·RGnϕ-
path. We reach a contradiction.
